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This paper reconciles two pronounced trends in U.S. corporate governance: the 
increase in pay levels for top executives, and the increasing prevalence of 
appointing CEOs through external hiring rather than internal promotions. We 
propose that these trends reflect a shift in the relative importance of “managerial 
ability” (transferable across companies) and “firm-specific human capital” 
(valuable only within the organization). We show that if the supply of workers in 
the corporate sector is relatively elastic, an increase in the relative importance of 
managerial ability leads to fewer promotions, more external hires, and an increase 
in equilibrium average wages for CEOs. We test our model using CEO pay and 
turnover data from 1970 to 2000. We show that CEO compensation is higher for 
CEOs hired from outside their firm, and for CEOs in industries where outside 
hiring is prevalent. 
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1. Introduction 
Executive compensation has increased dramatically over the past three decades. 
Although much of the increase coincides with an escalation in the use of executive stock 
options (Hall and Murphy, 2000, 2003), the base salaries and bonuses of Forbes 800 chief 
executive officers (CEOs) tripled over this time period, increasing from an average of 
$700,000 in 1970 (in 2002-constant dollars) to over $2.2 million in 2000.
1 As illustrated in 
Figure 1, the ratio of CEO pay to average pay for production workers also tripled over these 
three decades: the average CEO made just over 20 times more than the average production 
worker in 1970, and nearly 90 times more by 2000.
2
An equally pronounced, but less analyzed trend in U.S. corporate governance is the 
increasing prevalence of filling chief executive officer (CEO) openings through external 
hires rather than through internal promotions. Figure 2 shows the relative frequency of 
external vs. internal CEO replacements for companies in the annual Forbes surveys from 
1970 through 2000.
3 During the 1970s and 1980s, outside hires accounted for 15% and 17% 
of all CEO replacements, respectively. In contrast, during the 1990s (and through 2000) more 
than one in four CEOs were hired from outside the company.  
1   The Forbes 800 consists of companies in the top 500 ranked by revenues, income, assets, and market 
capitalization (on average, about 800 firms are ranked in the top 500 by at least one of these criterion).  
2   Production worker pay calculated as 52*(avg. weekly hours of production workers)*(avg. hourly earnings 
of production workers), based on data from the Current Employment Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
3   Executives serving in their firm for less than a year before the CEO appointment are considered external 
hires, while those employed for more than a year are considered inside hires. Data are based on 2,873 
newly appointed CEOs from 1,323 companies.  SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE2
In this paper, we develop and test a model that reconciles the trends in CEO pay levels 
and outside hirings. We propose that these trends reflect a shift in the relative importance of 
general and specific “managerial capital” (human capital specific to managerial positions). In 
particular, we distinguish between “general managerial ability” (managerial skills valuable 
across companies, including financial and accounting expertise and the ability to manage 
human and physical assets) and “firm-specific managerial capital” (reflecting skills, 
knowledge, contacts, and experience valuable only within the organization).
 4
We conjecture that over the past three decades, the society has steadily accumulated a 
body of knowledge in economics, management science, accounting, finance, and other 
disciplines, which, if mastered by a CEO, can substantially improve his ability to manage any 
modern corporation successfully. In addition, most information became available in 
computerized form at the tip of the manager’s (or his assistant’s) fingers.
5 While this is true 
for general and specific information alike, we find it plausible that computerization is more 
helpful in the case of concrete, firm-specific information about a company’s operation, like 
information about its product markets, its suppliers and clients, etc., than in the case of 
general knowledge. Computers allow for easy access, sorting, and analysis of specific 
information; it may therefore be less important that a present day CEO candidate spends an 
extended period of time in the company acquiring firm-specific knowledge. On the other 
hand, it is not much of an improvement if a manager can read about, say, the concept of 
strategic commitment from a computer monitor rather than from a textbook, and the 
4   Lazear (2003) has recently argued that a more informative view of firm-specific human capital is that each 
job requires a slightly different combination of a multiplicity of general skills. Our hypothesis that a 
relatively small set of general skills, acquired through the study of economics, accounting, finance, and 
related disciplines, are becoming more important for any senior managerial job, is consistent with this skill-
weights approach to specific-human capital.
5   Focusing on recent changes in wage inequality, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2003 and 2004) have put 
forward a related argument, positing that these changes are to a large extent driven by advances in 
communicating and processing knowledge and information. They develop an elegant framework for 
formalizing the effects of communication costs within organizations on the size distribution of hierarchies 
and on the distribution of wages.   SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE3
information is not going to be of much use to the manager anyway unless he masters related 
pieces of general knowledge, such as the basic principles of economics and game theory.  
In our model, the importance of the general relative to firm-specific component of 
managerial capital leads to fewer promotions, more external hires, and an increase in 
equilibrium average wages for CEOs. Underlying our analysis is the idea that, due to 
competition among potential employers in the managerial labor market, the CEOs can 
capture the whole marginal product created by their transferable ability, but the lack of 
alternative use for their firm-specific skills means that they can only extract a fraction of the 
rents created by this part of their human capital. Therefore, a shift in the relative importance 
of general managerial ability will lead to higher wages even if overall managerial marginal 
productivity declines.
6 The associated wage increase will be especially pronounced for the 
highest-ability managers, as competition for the most-talented managers becomes more 
intense.
Our approach offers new interpretations for both the increase in CEO pay levels and 
outside replacements. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) have argued that the escalation in 
pay reflects that pay levels are determined not by competitive market forces but rather by 
captive board members catering to rent-seeking entrenched managers. Under our approach, 
the increase in pay (coupled with the trend in external hires) is not only consistent with 
competition, but is evidence that the market for CEOs is becoming more important in 
determining CEO pay levels.
7 Both Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) and Hermalin (2003) 
have suggested that the trend in outside hiring reflects greater board diligence in monitoring 
the CEO. Our approach does not require increased board vigilance, and is consistent with our 
6    Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) argue that increased CEO pay levels reflect increased managerial 
productivity (which they propose is correlated with aggregate stock-market shocks); we predict higher 
wages without assuming increased productivity. 
7   Our interpretation is consistent with Bebchuk-Fried-Walker in one respect: the increase in the relative 
importance of transferable ability will allow CEOs to capture a larger share of the rents, as firms compete 
for scarce managerial talent. SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE4
results that the trend towards outside hiring is not driven by companies replacing poorly 
performing CEOs.
8
We begin in Section 2 by developing a partial-equilibrium model of one firm’s choice 
between filling a CEO vacancy with an internal or external candidate. As in our companion 
paper (Murphy and Zábojník, 2004), which contained a rudimentary version of the present 
framework, we model the CEO external-internal hiring choice as a trade-off between 
matching and firm-specific skills. When a company hires from outside, it foregoes valuable 
specific skills available only through internal promotions, but is able to hire from a larger 
opportunity set of managers which, in turn, allows better matching of managers and firms. As 
firm-specific capital becomes relatively less important, the benefit of better matching 
becomes large relative to the cost of (lost) specific capital, and the prevalence of outside 
hires will increase. Competition in the external labor market allows CEOs hired from the 
outside (without firm-specific capital) to capture all the rents through higher wages. 
Increasing the importance of the fully priced component of managerial productivity 
(transferable ability) relative to the partially priced component (specific capital) results in 
higher equilibrium wages, especially for the highest-ability managers. 
In Section 3, we develop a market equilibrium model of managerial production and 
hiring decisions. Specifically, we allow for the firm productivity to depend upon the number 
of firms in the industry and we let the shift in the importance of general managerial ability to 
affect the equilibrium wages of workers. We show that our basic results from Section 2 hold 
in the market-equilibrium setting when the market supply of workers is sufficiently elastic.  
Section 4 offers several extensions to the model. First, we allow individuals to choose 
their skill composition and show that individuals will invest more in general managerial 
skills (e.g., obtain MBA degrees) as the importance of the general skills increases. Second, 
we extend our model to boards of directors, in which the skills needed to effectively 
8   See Mikkelson and Partch (1997), Murphy (1999), and our updated analysis in Section 5 below. SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE5
represent the interests of shareholders depend upon the composition of managerial skills 
needed to run the company. We show that a decrease in the specificity of managerial skills 
will trigger a change in the board’s optimal composition; in particular, there will be a shift 
towards more outside directors and fewer inside directors, consistent with the trend observed 
in recent decades (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani, 1996). 
Section 5 considers alternative explanations for both the increase in pay levels and the 
shift towards external hires, and offers empirical evidence consistent with the managerial-
capital approach. We show that the increase in CEO pay has coincided with an increase in 
CEOs holding MBA degrees (which we use as a rough proxy for transferable managerial 
ability) and a decrease in firm-specific experience (which we use as a rough proxy for non-
transferable specific capital). In addition, we show that CEOs hired from the outside earn a 
premium relative to those promoted internally, and CEOs in industries with higher 
prevalence of external hirings earn more than CEOs in other industries. Taken together, these 
results are consistent with the Bebchuk-Fried-Walker hypothesis that CEOs are extracting a 
larger share of the rents than in the past, but inconsistent with their view that these increased 
rents reflect the influence of powerful incumbent executives over captive boards. Finally, we 
document that the increase in external hirings is not explained by boards going outside to 
replace poorly performing incumbents. 
Section 6 concludes and offers directions for future research. In particular, while we 
offer convincing circumstantial evidence consistent with a shift in the importance of 
managerial ability relative to firm-specific capital, we do not currently incorporate direct 
proxies for this shift into our empirical tests of the effect of managerial capital on the market 
for CEOs. All formal proofs are in the Appendix. SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE6
2. A partial-equilibrium model 
In order to motivate our analysis and develop the underlying intuition, we begin with 
a simple partial-equilibrium model of one firm’s choice between filling a CEO vacancy with 
an internal or external candidate. To expedite the analysis, we make here several simplifying 
assumptions about the market for workers and managers; most notably, (i) we assume that 
the incumbent managers who become CEOs do not capture any of the surplus generated by 
their firm-specific human capital, (ii) we abstract from the effects of new entry on the 
incumbent firms’ profitability, and (iii) we treat the wages of workers’ as exogenously fixed. 
We relax all of these assumptions, and provide a more formal and complete description of 
the economic environment, in our general-equilibrium model in Section 3. 
We assume that firms consist of workers and one CEO, and that they produce output 
by combining labor with the CEO’s managerial ability, a. In particular, a firm employing n
workers produces f(n)sa units of output. The function f(n) is increasing, concave and 
continuously differentiable, and satisfies f(0) = 0, f’(0) = f, and limnof f’(n) = 0. The
variable s captures the level of the CEO’s firm-specific knowledge: if the CEO is promoted 
internally, then s = 1, while if the firm hires an external candidate with no firm-specific 
knowledge, then s = J < 1. Note that the lower is J, the greater is the relative importance of 
the firm-specific skills for a CEO’s productivity. Note also that our assumption that if the 
CEO switches firms he loses the firm specific part of his human capital extends to the cases 
where the CEO starts his own firm. Such a new firm requires new employees whose abilities 
and competencies the CEO has to learn. Moreover, since trade secrets laws may prevent the 
CEO from taking with him the old employer’s client list, the new firm may be forced to 
develop new clients whose needs the CEO must learn. Similarly, he may have to create 
relationships with new suppliers, new investors, and so on. SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE7
Denote by w
M(a) the market wage for a manager/CEO of ability a and by w the 
market wage for workers. The profit of a firm with n workers and a CEO of ability a can then 
be written as 
S(n,a,s)   f (n)sa wn  w
M (a). (1) 
Basic trade-off. Suppose now that a firm with n workers has a CEO vacancy and a (single) 
internal candidate for the position, whose ability is â. This firm faces a “make or buy” 
tradeoff.  First, it can promote the internal candidate, in which case its profit is  
S(n,ˆ a,1)   f (n)ˆ a wn  w
M (ˆ a), 
thereby preserving firm-specific managerial capital (1-J)â. Alternatively, the firm can fill the 
CEO position by hiring from the outside market for managers (which we assume contains a 
sufficient supply of CEOs at each ability level a  R
+). The firm hiring from the outside 
forgoes the firm-specific capital, but can pick the candidate who is the best fit for its size, 
that is, the one with ability a* such that
a*{ argmax
a
f (n)Ja wn  w
M (a)  .
In this case, the firm’s profit is given by 
S(n,a*,J)   f(n) Ja*wn  w
M (a*).
Clearly, the firm promotes the internal candidate if the S(n,â,1) t S(n,a*,J) and hires 
from the outside market if the reverse is true. 
CEO wages. We assume that there is free entry of firms at any firm size. Therefore, any 
CEO of ability a can find a firm of size n*(a) that is the best match for his ability level:
n*(a){ argmax
n
f(n) Jawn  . (2) 
Thus, a CEO of ability a must be paid at least \(a){ f (n*(a))Ja wn* (a). Note that the 
market wage function \(a) is increasing and convex in a, and that larger firms are optimally SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE8
managed by higher-ability CEOs, as in Rosen (1982) and Waldman (1984).
9 Since each 
CEO can instead choose to work in a non-managerial position at wage w, the equilibrium 
wage of a CEO of ability a is determined as 
w
M (a,J)   max w,\(a) ^` { max w, f (n* (a))Ja w(n*(a)) ^` . (3) 
Figure 3 illustrates how the market wage for CEOs varies with managerial ability for a 
given level of J. Managers with ability a < a and all workers earn wage w, while managers 
with ability a t a earn \(a), where  a  is given by 
f (n*(a ))Ja  w(n*(a )) { w. (4) 
Firms’ optimal promotion strategy. Due to free entry of firms, the companies that fill their 
CEO positions with external hires earn at most zero profits in equilibrium. When the optimal 
managerial ability for a firm with size n is a* > a, then they earn exactly zero profit: 
substituting w
M(a) = \(a*) into S(n,a*,J) yields
S(n,a*,J)   f (n)Ja*wn \(a*)  0.
When a* < a, the profit from outside hiring is negative, S(n,a*,J) < 0, because the CEO 
earns w > \(a*). In this case the firm either promotes the internal candidate or exits the 
market. Thus, if a firm does not promote its internal candidate, it will either hire an outside 
CEO who is the best match for it or exit, in either case earning zero profit. The optimal 
promotion strategy of a firm whose internal candidate has ability â is to promote this 
candidate if S(n,â,1)   0, that is, if 
f(n)â – wn   w
M(â), (5)   
                                                
9   The latter claim follows because  0
"
'
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and hire from the outside otherwise. Note that inequality (5) can never hold if n is too small. 
We will therefore restrict our attention to firms that are sufficiently large, so that (5) can be 
satisfied at least for some internal candidates. Then, as Figure 4 illustrates, the fact that the 
firm’s profit gross of the manager’s wages, f(n)â – wn, is linear and increasing in â, while 
the CEO’s wage w
M(â) is non-decreasing and convex, means that inequality (5) holds if and 
only if the internal candidate’s ability falls within an interval [aL(n), aH(n)], where aL(n)  0
and aH(n) > a . Thus, the company will find it optimal to fill the CEO position internally if 
and only if the internal candidate’s ability, â, is sufficiently close to the company’s perfect 
fit, a*.
As discussed earlier, the profit from hiring an external candidate is negative when 
a*(n) < a. This means that if â < aL while at the same time a*(n) < a, the firm’s profit 
maximizing strategy is to exit the market. Consequently, small firms never hire their CEOs in 
the external market in our model – either their internal candidate turns out to have 
sufficiently high managerial skills, or they go out of business.
10 This feature of our model is 
consistent with existing empirical evidence suggesting that small firms are more likely to go 
bankrupt than large firms (e.g., Brown, Hamilton, and Medoff, 1990, p. 21).  
Model’s implications. Our basic premise is that over the past several decades, the general 
managerial skills have become more important relative to firm-specific knowledge. In our 
model, this shift is represented by an increase in J from some initial JL to some JH > JL, as 
illustrated in Figure 5 (for the specific firm that we depict, aL is smaller than a, although for 
larger firms the relationship is reversed). The figure conveys three interesting implications of 
this change:
x First, consistent with the trend in executive compensation documented in Figure 1, the 
increase in J brings about an increase in the absolute and relative CEO market wages. 
                                                
10   Formally, this claim applies to those firms for which n < n, where n is given by a*(n) = a. Because 
a*(n) decreases in n, a*(n) < a for all such firms. SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE10
Graphically, this is represented as an upwards shift in the CEO wage curve, from \(JL) = 
f(n*)JLa  – wn* to \(JH) = f(n*)JHa  – wn*.
x Second, the increase in managerial market wages means that more workers decide to 
become managers (perhaps in their own firms), which is reflected in the decrease in the 
cutoff ability level a.
x Finally, in accord with the trend documented in Figure 2, the propensity of firms to hire 
their CEOs from the outside increases. The reason is that while they have to get the same 
wages, an increase in J  decreases the gap between the respective productivities of the 
internal and external candidates of the same ability, because the internal candidates’ 
productivity (given by the line f(N)a – wN) does not depend on J. This conclusion can be 
seen in Figure 5 from the fact that aH decreases. (In the figure, aL stays the same because 
w is unaffected by a change in J in the present partial equilibrium setting. However, for 
large firm sizes aL is greater than a, in which case aL increases with J. This reinforces 
our conclusion that the probability of internal promotion decreases as managerial skills 
become less specific.)  
3. The market-equilibrium framework 
In this section, we fill in further details regarding the market environment in which the firms 
and the agents operate. We also complete the analysis by incorporating the effects of an 
increase in J on the equilibrium market wage w and by allowing the newly entering firms to 
affect the incumbent firms’ profitability. We show here that the straightforward comparative 
statics effects described in the previous section become somewhat more complicated when a 
change in the equilibrium worker wage is taken into account, because an increase in J brings 
about an increase in w, which tends to offset the effects we have just described. Nevertheless, 
it will turn out that the basic economic intuition developed earlier continues to hold in the SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE11
market equilibrium setting, although some of the results will require a sufficiently elastic 
supply of workers. 
In addition to allowing for endogenous determination of firm profitability and for 
changes in J to affect the equilibrium market wage w, we also relax our earlier assumption 
that the firm captures the entire surplus generated by the CEOs’ firm-specific capital. In 
particular, we allow incumbent managers who become CEOs to extract part of the rents from 
their firm-specific capital, and show that our results are not affected (so long as the CEO 
does not capture the whole surplus). 
FIRMS AND WORKERS. Consider a two-period economy with measure one of workers born at t 
= 1, which is the beginning of the first period. The workers in the first period of their 
working life will be termed as young, the second period workers will be referred to as old or 
experienced workers. For simplicity, young workers will be assumed to be liquidity 
constrained, so that their wages cannot be negative.
The economy consists of two sectors: a corporate sector, which will be the focus of 
our analysis, and a self-employment sector. It is the mobility of workers between these two 
sectors that makes both the workers’ wages and the firms’ profitability endogenously 
determined in equilibrium. The productivity of a young worker employed in either sector is 
zero. Each old worker in the self-employment sector produces and earns M(Nm), where M(.) : 

+ o
+  is a decreasing, concave and differentiable function, m is the measure (determined 
endogenously in equilibrium) of old workers employed in this sector, and N is a parameter 
that will allow us to vary the elasticity of labor supply in the corporate sector.
The corporate sector consists of firms, each of them characterized by the number of 
workers, n, that it employs in a given period. At t = 1, there is a measure Q < 1 of existing 
firms in the corporate sector, whose sizes are drawn from a set S 
+, according to a 
cumulative distribution H(n). Thus,  ) (n dH
S ³   Q .SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE12
At t = 2, there is free entry at any firm size n 
+. Also, at this time any existing 
firm can adjust its level of employment from n to n’ by exiting and re-entering at a new size, 
n’. Each corporate sector firm has one CEO position and one position in which it can train a 
young worker for the CEO job. The supply of non-managerial workers in the second period 
depends upon their wage, w — the higher is this wage, the higher is the number of workers 
that choose the corporate sector over the self-employment sector.  
WORKERS’S KILLS. Old workers differ according to their managerial ability, a, accumulated 
during the first period of their employment. The underlying distribution of ability a in the 
population is given by a cumulative distribution function G(a), with support 
+. If a worker 
did not work in the corporate sector when young, then he does not posses the managerial 
skill when old, i.e., a = 0 for this worker.  
As in Section 2, a worker’s managerial ability only affects his productivity if assigned 
to the CEO position. Again, a fraction 1-J of a worker’s ability is a firm-specific skill, and is 
developed only by the workers placed in the trainee position when young. This skill is not 
transferable across firms — if a worker with a firm-specific managerial training changes his 
employer after the first period, or if the worker’s first-period employer adjusts its size at the 
beginning of the second period by exiting and re-entering at a different size, this skill is lost.
PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY IN THE CORPORATE SECTOR AND RENT EXTRACTION. If all CEOs 
received their market wages, the profit of a firm of size n would be  ) , , ( s a n S  as given by (1) 
in the previous section. To allow for the possibility that CEOs extract additional rents from 
their firms, we will assume that if  ) , , ( s a n S  is positive, then in addition to his market wage 
w
M(a,J), the firm’s CEO captures a share  ) 1 , 0 (  U  of  ) , , ( s a n S  as a rent. The rent of a CEO 
of ability a, employed by a firm of size n, can therefore be written as 
)} , , ( , 0 max{ ) , , ( s a n s a n R US   ,SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE13
and his total pay is P(n,a,J) = w
M(a,J) + R(n,a,s). 
The profit of the firm, taking into account the rent extraction by the incumbent 
manager promoted to CEO, is (1-U)( f (n)sawn wM(a)) if profit is positive, and 
f (n)sawn wM(a) if profit is negative. Note that no firm would find it optimal to 
promote to the CEO position a worker who was not employed in the corporate sector when 
young, because a = 0 for such workers.
WAGE OFFERS AND JOB ASSIGNMENTS. At the beginning of the second period (which will be 
the focus of our analysis), firms observe the ability a of every old worker in the corporate 
sector. Each existing firm then either promotes its CEO trainee, or hires a new CEO from the 
market.
11 In addition, we allow existing firms to decide upon their optimal size, n, and new 
firms to enter. Next, all firms make simultaneous job offers and wage bids to all workers in 
the economy. After that, each worker decides which offer to accept. Workers that do not like 
any of their job offers can go and start their own firms.
3.1 The Analysis 
We have assumed that the young workers are not productive in either sector. However, 
being employed in the corporate sector has an option value, due to the possibility of 
becoming a CEO. Therefore, all young workers will seek employment in the corporate 
sector, which will drive their equilibrium wages to zero. However, our main interest lies in 
deriving the equilibrium pay of old workers in both the CEO and non-CEO positions, as well 
as the equilibrium level of CEO turnover. The goal of our analysis is to use these results to 
                                                
11   Conceptually, the company could promote a non-trainee current employee rather than external hire. In our 
model there is no advantage to doing so and one large disadvantage: the probability of finding a perfect 
“match” among current employees is trivially small. SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE14
examine the effects of a change in the relative importance of general skills on both the 
absolute and relative levels of CEO compensation and on the proclivity of firms to hire 
outside CEOs. 
In the previous section, we have shown that an established firm of size n will promote 
its internal trainee if and only if the trainee’s ability is between the cutoff levels aL(n) and  
aH(n). Note that aL can be either smaller or greater than a. In the subsequent analysis, we 
will sometimes need to distinguish between these two cases. We will therefore write aL1
when n is such that aL  a, and the set of firm sizes such that aL = aL1 will be denoted as S1,
i.e., S1 = {n  S | aL(n)  a}. Similarly, we will write aL2 when aL > a, and denote the 
corresponding set of n as S2, i.e., S2 = {n  S | aL(n) > a}. We will keep using aL when this 
distinction is not important.  
If the internal trainee’s ability is aL1, so that his market wage is w, then promoting this 
candidate must yield zero profit, because by definition of aL1 the firm is indifferent between 
promoting the trainee and hiring an outside CEO, which yields zero profit. The cut-off ability 
aL1 is therefore given by
 f(n)aL1 – wn = w.  (6)
Note that given that  0 ) , , (   s a n S  when condition (6) holds, the cut-off level aL1 is
independent of the rent-extraction parameter U.
In a similar vein, if the internal trainee’s ability is aL2 his market wage is f(nL2*)J aL2
– wnL2*, where we use nL2* = n*(aL2) to simplify notation, and the firm is indifferent 
between promoting this trainee and hiring from the outside (which yields zero profit). This 
determines aL2 through
 f(n)aL2 – wn  = f(nL2*)J aL2 – wnL2*. (7)
Finally, aH is determined in a similar way as aL2, through SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE15
 f(n)aH – wn  = f(nH*)JaH  – wnH*, (8)
where nH* = n*(aH). Again, it should be clear that aL2 and aH are independent of U.
  Given the optimal rule for internal promotions, we can now formally describe the 
equilibrium job assignments of old workers.  
Lemma 1. A worker j with managerial ability aj will become a CEO if and only if either (i) 
aj  a  or (ii) he was placed in the trainee position in the first period and aj  aL1(n).
In words, the group of all CEOs includes all those workers whose ability turned out to be 
sufficiently high (higher than a), plus all the trainees whose managerial skills are between 
aL1(n) and a, where n is the size of their first-period employer. The group of the CEOs 
promoted from the inside consists of all the trainees whose managerial skills are between 
aL(n) and aH(n).
MARKET CLEARING. In equilibrium, the workers whose market wage is w must be indifferent 
between working in the corporate sector and working in the self-employment sector, that is, 
it must be that  
 w  =  M(m/N). 
This implicitly defines the number of workers, m, working in the self-employment sector as a 
function of the wage w:
 m(w,N) = M
-1(w)N . 
Because M(.) is a decreasing function, m(w,N) decreases in w. Note that since the total 
measure of workers is 1, the supply of workers in the corporate sector is given by 1 – m(w,N),
and the larger is N, the higher is the elasticity of labor supply in this sector.SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE16






f ³ dH(n) (nn
*(a))dG(a)
a
aH(n) ³  (n1)dG(a)
aL1(n)





S2 ³  m(w,N) 1
(9)
The first term in (9) is the measure of agents employed in newly established firms— 
those started by workers who worked in the industry when young and whose ability is at least 
a. The remaining three integrals correct the first integral. The first term in the square 
brackets says that, in existing firms of size n such that aL < a, the trainees whose ability 
turned out to be between a and aH were promoted to head their old firms and thus employ n
rather than n*(a) non-managerial workers. The last term in the first line adds the workers 
who are employed by existing firms whose internal candidates turned out to be of lower 
ability than a, but were promoted nevertheless, because their ability was higher than aL1.
The integral in the second line represents a correction for those established firms for which 
aL > a; it again says that all the trainees who were promoted to head their old firms employ 
n, rather than n*(a), non-managerial workers. Finally, m(w,N) is the measure of workers that 
chose to work in the self-employment sector. 
Equations (2), (4), and (6) – (9) jointly determine the second-period market 
equilibrium in this economy, which will be denoted as (w*, a *,a L1*(n), aL2*(n), aH*(n), 
n*(a)).
3.2 The Effects of an Increase in the Importance of the General Managerial Skill
As anticipated in the previous section, the ultimate goal of our analysis is to examine 
the effects on wages and CEO turnover of an increase in the relative importance of the 
general managerial skill. In other words, we are interested in what happens to the average SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE17
CEO wages, the average worker wages, the ratio of the average CEO wage to the average 
worker wage, and the probability that a firm’s CEO will be hired from the outside, when the 
parameter  J increases. We start by examining the effects of an increase in J on the 
equilibrium variables w*, a *,a L1*(n), aL2*(n), aH*(n), n*(a), and w
M*(a).
Lemma 2. For any J and U from (0,1), any production functions f(n) and M(m), and any 
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When the managerial skills become more general, each agent becomes more 
productive as a CEO in the outside market. If the wages of workers do not change, this 
higher productivity tends to increase the optimal size (n
*(a)) of the firm he should manage. 
Moreover, with w* constant, higher market productivity also means higher market wages for 
CEOs (w
M*(a)), which increases the supply of potential CEOs and hence also the number of 
newly established firms. Consequently, demand for workers increases, which drives their 
equilibrium wage (w*) up.  Because the productivity of a CEO promoted internally does not 
depend upon the fraction of his skills that is transferable to other firms, an increase in J,
followed by the resulting increase in the wages of old non-managerial workers, make it less 
profitable to promote internal trainees, which is reflected in an increase in each firm’s cutoff 
ability level aL and a decrease in the cutoff level aH.SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE18
The effect of an increase in J on the equilibrium market wages of CEOs is somewhat 
more complicated. The direct effect is as described above, i.e., the CEO market wages tend 
to increase due to the CEOs’ higher outside productivity. However, there is also an indirect 
effect, through an increase in worker wage w*, which works in the opposite direction, 
decreasing the CEOs’ outside productivity, and hence their market wages. The direct effect 
prevails, and the CEO market wages increase, if the worker wage does not increase too 
much, which holds if the elasticity of labor supply (captured by N) is sufficiently large. These 
effects lead to our main results regarding the frequency of internal promotions, as well as the 
CEOs’ absolute and relative total compensation, as described below. 
THE EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE IN J ON AVERAGE AND RELATIVE WAGES. Lemma 2 showed 
that if the supply of workers in the corporate sector is sufficiently elastic, an increase in J
causes a rise in the market wage of a CEO of any given ability a, as well as in the wage of 
non-managerial workers. This implies the following result.  
Proposition 1. As managerial skills become more general (J increases), (i) the average 
worker wage always increases, and (ii) both the average market wage and average total pay 
of a CEO increase if the supply of workers in the corporate sector is sufficiently elastic (i.e., 
if N is relatively large). 
Since for sufficiently elastic labor supply the average wages increase for both the 
managerial and non-managerial workers, the effect of an increase in J on the ratio of the 
average CEO to the average non-managerial wages is less straightforward. However, as the 
following proposition shows, a sufficient condition for this ratio to be increasing in J is again 
that labor supply in the corporate sector is sufficiently elastic. 
Proposition 2. Suppose that the supply of workers in the corporate sector is sufficiently 
elastic (i.e., N is relatively large). Then as managerial skills become more general, both the 
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THE EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE IN J ON THE PROBABILITY OF INTERNAL PROMOTION. As shown 
earlier, a given firm of size n promotes its first period trainee if and only if his managerial 
ability, â, is from the interval [aL(n),aH(n)]. The comparative statics results in Lemma 2, 
according to which aL*(n) increases and aH*(n) decreases in J, have the following immediate 
implication.  
Proposition 3. As managerial skills become more general (J increases), the probability that 
any given firm fills its CEO position with an internal rather than an outside candidate 
decreases.
As mentioned earlier, the productivity of a CEO promoted internally does not depend 
upon the fraction of his skills that is firm specific. Therefore, if there is an increase in the 
importance of the general managerial skill, the subsequent rise in the wages of old non-
managerial workers makes internal promotions relatively less profitable. This induces the 
firms to decrease the set of ability realizations for which they are willing to promote the 
internal trainee.
A related implication of our model is that small firms (those with n < n) become more 
likely to go out of business as J increases, which follows directly from the fact that aL1(n)
increases. The intuition is that an increase in the wage w that a firm with an internal 
candidate of low ability would have to pay its CEO makes it less likely that the firm would 
be able to break even.SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE20
4. Extensions 
4.1 Endogenous skill choice 
So far, we have treated the composition of an individual’s managerial skills, captured by the 
parameter J, as exogenous. However, since most of the predictions that we derive from our 
model are driven by a change in this parameter, ideally we would like to know what triggers 
this change and what determines J in the first place. While we do not have a complete answer 
to these questions, in this subsection we make a step towards endogenizing J, by letting 
workers choose their skill composition in the first period of their employment. Specifically, 
suppose that each worker employed in the corporate sector when young can choose how 
much effort, time, and other resources to invest into making his human capital more 
transferable across companies. To formalize this, assume that an old worker i’s level of 
general skills, Ji, is given by
Ji = J(ei,I),  
where ei is the worker’s first period investment. The fact that more investment makes the 
worker’s skills more marketable is represented by the assumption that Je(ei,I) > 0. Parameter 
I measures how productive is a given level of investment. For example, I could depend upon 
the level of general knowledge the society has accumulated about managing firms. The 
considerable progress that we have witnessed over the past decades in economics, finance, 
management, marketing, accounting, and other fields that enhance one’s general ability to 
manage a modern company effectively would be captured by an increase in I in our model. 
Arguably, due to this progress, any given amount of time and effort a worker spends 
mastering these fields enhances his general managerial skills more today than it would, say, 
thirty years ago. To capture this effect, we assume that JI (ei,I) > 0 and JIe (ei,I) > 0.
Investment in transferable human capital is costly – if a worker i invests an amount e,
he has to bear a personal cost c(e), where c(.) is an increasing function. Finally, to keep the SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE21
analysis simple the and save on space, we will assume here that CEOs extract no rents, i.e., U
= 0. Then, using the observation that, analogous to (3), the equilibrium wage of a worker of 
ability ai is w(ai,J) = max{w,\(ai)}, worker i’s optimal level of investment, ei*, maximizes 
his expected utility, 
Ea(U(ei,I)) { Ea(w(a,Ji(e,I))) – c(ei),
where Ea(w(a,Ji)) is a young worker’s expectation of his wage when old, conditional on the 
amount of his investment in general skills, ei. We will assume that for any I, the worker’s 
optimization problem has an interior solution, ei*(I), which is unique (a sufficient, but not 
necessary, condition for this is that c(.) is convex and satisfies the usual conditions c(0) = 
c’(0 )= 0 and limeĺ c(e) = f). Worker i’s investment problem can then be written as 
 max
ei
{w*G(a ) [ f(n*(a))aJ(ei,I)w* n*(a)]dG(a)c(ei)}
a
f ³ .
This allows us to derive the following result. 
Proposition 4. As investment in general managerial skills becomes more productive, each 
worker optimally increases his investment in general skills, and this increases the proportion 
of his skills that is transferable across firms (
wei *
wI





To the extent that MBA education makes one’s managerial skills more general, 
Proposition 4 implies that as MBA education becomes more efficient (either due to an 
advancement in economics, finance and other related fields, or due to some other change in 
the productivity of general skills), relatively more people acquire an MBA degree. Moreover, 
although our model does not speak to this directly, we would expect a relatively higher 
increase in the share of MBA educated CEOs among the CEOs hired from the outside than 
among those hired from the inside.  SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE22
4.2 Specificity of managerial skills and the composition of the board of directors 
Recent years have brought not only a pronounced increase in the absolute and relative pay 
received by the CEOs of the largest corporations, but also a gradual change in the 
composition of boards of directors, which are becoming increasingly independent 
(Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003). The theory we are proposing here can also be applied to 
explain the latter trend. To see this, suppose that there are two types of directors: independent 
directors, recruited from outsiders not affiliated with the company, and inside directors, who 
serve — or served in the past — as the company’s executives. The comparative advantage of 
inside directors is that they have firm-specific knowledge, which makes their services more 
valuable. On the other hand, just like with the CEOs, outside directors may have greater 
general ability and expertise, or represent a better match for the company, than the insiders, 
but they lack the firm-specific knowledge.  
Formally, let V(dI,dO,J) be the net value to the firm created by a board of directors that 
consists of dI insiders and dO outsiders, conditional on the specificity of managerial ability 
being J (where we again treat J as exogenous). To some extent, the two types of directors are 
substitutes for each other; we will therefore assume that VIO < 0, where Vx denotes the 
derivative of V with respect to dx, x = I,O. To capture the idea that as the firm-specific skills 
become less important for running a company the outside directors’ marginal productivity 
increases, we will assume that VOJ > 0. On the other hand, the inside directors’ productivity 
is unaffected by J, so that VIJ = 0. Finally, let (dI
*(J),dO
*(J)) be the unique board composition 
that maximizes V(dI,dO,J), and assume that dI
*,dO
*  (0,f). In this setting, the change in the 
optimal composition of a firm’s board of directors in response to a change in the composition 
of managerial skills is characterized by the following proposition.  SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE23
Proposition 5. As managerial skills become more general, each firm optimally increases the 
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As the skills needed to manage a public corporation become more general, outside 
directors become relatively more efficient in monitoring a firm’s management and this 
reflects in an increase in the optimal number of outside directors on the company’s board. 
Moreover, because the outside and inside directors are partial substitutes in their monitoring 
and advisory functions, the number of inside directors optimally decreases.  
5. Empirical Evidence and Alternative Explanations
The primary empirical implications of our model relate to the effect of increases in J
(the relative importance of general managerial capital) on CEO wages and the internal-vs.-
external appointment decision. In particular, and assuming a sufficiently elastic supply for 
production workers, as managerial skills become more general (J increases) we predict 
increases in CEO wages (in both absolute terms and relative to wages for production 
workers), in external hiring (relative to internal promotions), in investments in general skills, 
and in the proportion of outsiders on corporate boards of directors. 
In this section, we offer indirect tests of our model. Testing our propositions directly 
requires a proxy for the relative importance of general managerial skills. While we cannot 
currently construct such a proxy, we document below both a decline in own-firm experience 
(a typical proxy for the level of firm-specific capital) and an increase in MBA education (a 
potential proxy for general managerial ability). In addition, we test our propositions 
indirectly by examining the correlation between outside hiring and CEO pay. Finally, we SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE24
consider alternative explanations for both the increase in pay levels and the shift towards 
external hires documented in Figures 1 and 2. 
5.1 Indirect Evidence 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for 2,783 CEOs appointed in 1,323 companies from 
1970 through 2000. The full sample is based on 4,633 executives and 2,144 companies 
appearing in Forbes annual surveys between 1970 and 2000. As shown in Panel A, new 
appointments account for about 10% of the Forbes CEOs from 1970 to 1989; CEO turnover 
increased modestly to 11.3% in the 1990s. Although most newly appointed CEOs are 
promoted internally, the prevalence of external hires has increased dramatically, from 14.9% 
in the 1970s to 17.2% in the 1980s to 26.5% from 1990-2000. Panel B shows that the 
average age of newly appointed CEOs has increased slightly over the past three decades. 
Executives promoted internally tend to be older than those hired from the outside, but only 
the difference in the 1970s is statistically significant. 
Our model predicts that if general managerial skills become more important, managers 
will spend more resources in acquiring this skill, at the expense of the firm-specific human 
capital. Panel C of Table 1 shows that the average job tenure (prior to CEO appointment) has 
declined substantially over the last thirty years, driven in a large part by the increased 
prevalence of outside hires (who, by construction, have a year or less of tenure upon 
appointment) and to a smaller degree by a decline in the average tenure for inside 
appointments. Panel D shows that newly appointed CEOs with MBA degrees have doubled 
from only 13.8% in the 1970s to 28.7% in the 1990s. CEOs hired from the outside in the 
1970s were significantly more likely to have MBA degrees than those hired from the inside; 
this difference diminished in the 1980s and reversed in the 1990s. Overall, we view the 
decline in own-firm experience (the proxy for the level of firm-specific capital) and the 
increase in MBA education (the proxy for general managerial ability) as being consistent 
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We indirectly test our model by examining whether industry wage differences are 
explained, in part, by the prevalence of outside hiring within the industry. Implicitly, we 
allow for managerial capital that is industry specific but general within the industry. Given 
this assumption, a straightforward extension of our model suggests that industries with 
higher industry-specific J’s will have higher CEO pay and more outside hiring. We test this 
hypothesis using a two-step process. First, we estimate annual industry wage premiums by 
estimating the following regression: 
ln(CEO Payit) = Dt + Etln(Salesit) + Djt, (10) 
where ln(CEO Payit) is the natural logarithm of the salary and bonus for a CEO in firm i in 
year t, and Djt is a vector of year and industry-specific dummy variables based on one-digit 
primary SIC codes. The compensation data required to estimate (10), in thousands of 2002-
constant dollars, are extracted from annual Forbes surveys, supplemented with data from 
Compustat’s ExecuComp database.  CEOs in their first partial year are excluded from this 
analysis.
In the second step, the estimated industry wage premiums,  ˆ D jt, are regressed on the 
prevalence of outside hires in the industry over years t-5 to t-1, 
ˆ D jt   PG
External Hires in Industry jt-5 to t-1







Table 2 reports the coefficients from estimating (11). The coefficient on outside hiring 
of 1.196 is positive and statistically significant, indicating that industry wage premiums are, 
indeed, correlated with the prevalence of external CEO appointments in the industry. In 
particular, a ten-point increase in outside hiring (from, say 15 percent to 25 percent) results 
in additional industry wage premium of almost 13 percent.
12 We interpret this result as strong 
12   Calculated as e
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evidence of an underlying connection between the trends in CEO pay and external 
appointments, which in turn provides circumstantial evidence consistent with our model. 
5.2 Alternative Explanations 
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003) have argued that the 
escalation in CEO pay reflects that pay levels are determined not by competitive market 
forces but rather by captive board members catering to rent-seeking entrenched managers. 
Their rent-extraction view focuses on incumbent executives exercising power and influence 
over outside directors who are “connected to the executives by bonds of interest, collegiality, 
or affinity.” A natural way to contrast their rent-extraction hypothesis with our model is to 
compare the compensation of CEOs hired from the outside (without established connections 
to the board) to CEOs hired from the inside (who presumably have such connections). In the 
Bebchuk-Fried-Walker model, CEOs promoted internally should earn more than CEOs hired 
from the outside. In our model (and as suggested by the results in Table 2), the increase in 
CEO pay is related to the increase in external hiring, not an increase in managerial 
entrenchment. 
Table 3 reports coefficients from regressions explaining cross-sectional differences in 
CEO salaries and bonuses. The dependent variable for all regressions is the logarithm of cash 
compensation, and independent variables include the logarithm of company revenues (as a 
control for company size) and four zero-one dummy variables, including dummies for CEOs 
serving in their first year, CEOs originally hired externally, and the “External” dummy 
interacted with the new CEO dummies. The regressions also include 310 “industry-year” 
fixed effects (separate dummy variables for each year for each industry, based on one-digit 
primary SIC codes).  
For our purposes, the most interesting coefficients in Table 3 are the coefficients on 
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partial year in office. The coefficient in column (1) of Table 3 of .1421 is positive and 
significant, and indicates that CEOs hired from the outside earn approximately 15.3 percent 
more than CEOs who were promoted internally. The coefficients in columns (2), (3), and (4) 
indicate that the premium for external hires has increased over time, from 6.5 percent in the 
1970s to 17.2 percent in the 1980s and 21.6 percent in the 1990s. These results suggest that 
the increase in CEO pay from 1970 to 2000 has been driven, at least, in part, by the increase 
in external hiring. We interpret these findings as being generally consistent with our model, 
but inconsistent with the Bebchuk-Fried-Walker hypothesis.
13 Indeed, under our approach, 
the increase in pay (coupled with the trend in external hires) is not only consistent with 
competition, but is evidence that the market for CEOs is becoming more important in 
determining CEO pay levels.
Note that the regressions in Table 3 include data for CEOs promoted or hired during the 
fiscal year, and these CEOs will predictably receive lower salaries and bonuses than CEOs in 
office for the entire year. Thus, the coefficient on “First Year as CEO” is negative and 
significant in all regressions in Table 3, reflecting mid-year appointments for internally 
promoted CEOs spending part of the year at a lower position in the company. Similarly, the 
(External Hire) u (First Year) dummy is negative and significant (except for in the 1970s, 
when the coefficients are positive but insignificant), indicating that partial-year CEOs hired 
from outside earn even less in their first year than internal promotions (because, external 
hires naturally earn no compensation from the company prior to their appointment).  
Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) and Hermalin (2003) have suggested that the trend in 
outside hiring reflects greater board diligence in monitoring the CEO. Underlying these 
propositions are three stylized facts regarding CEO turnover: (1) there is an inverse relation 
13   While in our model the average wage of the CEOs hired from the outside is not unambiguously higher than 
the average wage of the CEOs promoted internally, the model predicts a wage premium for external CEOs 
as long as the probability that a firm’s inside candidate is ‘too good’ for the firm is sufficiently small 
(formally,   dG(a)
a
aH (n) ³  is small). We believe that this is a reasonable assumption with respect to the 
companies in our sample, given that these companies represent the biggest firms in the economy. SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE28
between net-of-industry performance and the probability of management turnover (Coughlan 
and Schmidt, 1985, and Warner, Watts, and Wruck, 1988); the magnitude of the turnover-
performance relation is strongest in companies dominated by independent outside directors 
(Weisbach, 1988); and (3) companies performing poorly relative to their industry are most 
likely to hire a replacement CEO from outside the firm (Parrino, 1997). Hermalin extends 
this argument to provide an explanation for the upward trend in compensation: CEO pay 
increases because more monitoring by the boards forces CEOs to exert more effort and 
consume fewer perquisites, for which they have to be compensated.  
In our model, the increase in external hiring is driven by an increase in the relative 
importance of general managerial skills, and not by an increase in performance-related 
terminations. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 4 reports coefficients from ordinary least-squares 
regressions predicting the annual probability of CEO turnover as a function of firm 
performance and a dummy variable for retirement-aged CEOs.
14 In order to test whether 
performance-related dismissals have increased in recent years, we estimate the following 
regression for the 1970s, 1980s, and for 1990-2000: 
Prob(Turnover) = a + b Dummy  1












 (12)   
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the CEO is serving in his last full fiscal year and 0 
otherwise.
The regression intercepts in columns (1) through (3) of Table 4 imply that a young 
executive in an average-performing firm (i.e., realizing zero net-of-industry returns) had a 
departure probability of about 7.8% in the 1970s, 11.5% in the 1980s, and 21.1% in the 
1990s. The coefficients on the retirement-age dummies are positive and significant but 
declining over time, suggesting that age is becoming a less important factor in executive 
14   We also estimated turnover probabilities using logistic methodologies and obtained qualitatively identical 
results; we focus on the OLS results because of efficiencies in interpretation and exposition. SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE29
departures. The negative and significant coefficients on two-year net-of-industry returns 
implies that departure probabilities for CEOs realizing returns 30% below the industry 
average were increased by 0.4% in the 1970s, 0.7% in the 1980s, and 0.4% in the 1990s. 
These findings are consistent with those of Mikkelson and Partch (1997) and indicate that the 
turnover-performance relation (measured by the increased departure probability associated 
with poor performance) has fallen since the 1980s. Taken together, our results indicate a 
structural shift in CEO departures over the past thirty years, but there is no evidence that the 
shift reflects increased board vigilance in replacing poorly performing managers. 
Columns (4) through (6) of Table 4 report estimates from regressions predicting the 
probability of filling a CEO vacancy from outside the firm, based on the sample of 2,104 
CEO departures from 1970 to 2000. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the new CEO is 
hired externally, and 0 if the new CEO is promoted from within. The dependent variables are 
the same as in columns (1) and (3) and reflect the age and performance of the departing 
CEO. The coefficient on the two-year net-of-industry variable in column (4) is negative and 
(marginally) significant, indicating that outside replacements were more likely following 
poor net-of-industry performance than after good performance. However, by the 1990s 
(column (6)) there is no relation between performance and the probability of an outside hire 
(conditional on replacing the incumbent CEO). These results are also inconsistent with the 
claim that increased external hiring reflects increases in board vigilance. 
6. Conclusion 
The level of executive compensation is a controversial topic that attracts attention of 
both academic researchers and popular press. Arguably, to a large extent this attraction can 
be attributed to the pronounced and continuing increase in both absolute and relative levels 
of pay received by top executives in large companies. Some observers believe that this trend 
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boards. This increased power, the argument goes, allows the CEOs to extract more rents from 
their companies, at the expense of the companies’ workers and shareholders.  
We argue that this explanation is not entirely convincing. There appears to be no reason 
why boards should be more captive today than they were twenty years ago. If anything, the 
evidence suggests the opposite, as the boards have become more independent over time. 
Moreover, CEOs hired from the outside appear to earn a premium compared to those 
promoted internally, which is hard to reconcile with the rent-extraction hypothesis. 
We offer an alternative view of what determines the level of CEO compensation and of 
the forces that lead to its absolute and relative increase. In our theory, the level of CEO pay is 
determined by competition among firms for top performing managers, and depends upon the 
portion of the CEOs’ skills that is transferable across firms and industries. We suggest that 
the increase in executive compensation can be explained by an increase in the importance of 
general managerial skills, as opposed to firm-specific knowledge, in managing the modern 
corporation. As we show in the paper, this explanation is consistent not only with an increase 
in absolute and relative levels of CEO pay, but also with the observed increase in the share of 
CEO vacancies filled with external hires, with the increase in the share of external directors 
on corporate boards, with the increase in the share of CEOs with MBA degrees, and with the 
decline in the managers’ average job tenure prior to being appointed CEO. 
We offer several indirect tests of our model, including documenting that industry wage 
premiums are related to the prior prevalence of outside hiring within the industry. In 
addition, we present evidence counter to leading (but mutually inconsistent) alternative 
explanations for the increase in CEO pay (captive boards influenced by powerful 
incumbents) and external hires (increased board vigilance in replacing poorly performing 
managers). However, while we offer convincing circumstantial evidence consistent with a 
shift in the importance of managerial ability relative to firm-specific capital, we currently 
offer no direct evidence of why this shift has occurred. We have already suggested the SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE31
possibility that general managerial ability is becoming more productive due to the gradual 
accumulation of knowledge pertinent to the management of public corporations, including 
advances in accounting, economics, finance, marketing, and management science. In future 
research, we intend to identify these factors more precisely and to incorporate direct proxies 
for these changes into our empirical tests of the affect of managerial capital on the market for 
CEOs.SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE32
Figure 1 
Ratio of Average CEO Pay to Average Pay for Production Workers, 1970-2000 





































Ratio of Average CEO Salary and Bonus to
Average Annual Earnings of Production Workers
Note:  CEO sample is based on the Forbes 800, which includes all corporations ranked in the top 500 based on sales, 
assets, market capitalization, or income. The sample includes 4,597 executives from 2,144 firms from 1970 to 2000. 
Worker pay represents 52 times the average weekly hours of production workers multiplied by the average hourly 
earnings, based on data from the Current Employment Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics. SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE33
Figure 2 
Outside Hires as Percentage of New CEO Appointments, 1970-2000 



















































1970-1979 Avg: 14.9% 1980-1989 Avg: 17.2% 1990-2000 Avg: 26.5%
Note:  Figure shows the fraction of newly appointed CEOs hired from the outside. Executives serving in their firm for less 
than a year before the CEO appointment are considered external hires, while those employed for more than a year 
are considered inside hires. Data include all companies appearing in Forbes annual surveys between 1970 and 2000, 
and include 2,783 newly appointed CEOs from 1,323 companies. (The full Forbes database includes 4,633 
executives and 2,144 firms, but we exclude CEOs appointed prior to the first year the company is included in the 
Forbes surveys, and also exclude CEOs appointed after the last year the company is included in the Forbes surveys). SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE34
Figure 3 











Note: Figure illustrates how wages vary with managerial ability, a. Managers with a < a  and all workers earn 
worker marginal productivity of w. Wages for managers with a > a  are increasing and strictly convex in 
ability.SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE35
Figure 4 












Internal External External or Exit
 f(N)a – wN
Note: Figure illustrates the internal vs. external hiring decisions for a firm with N workers. The firm will 
promote internally if its management trainee has ability within the “promotion range” of aL(N) d  â d
aH(N).SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE36
Figure 5 




























Note: Figure 5 illustrates the effect of an increase in J on managerial wages and on the promotion decision for 
a firm of size N. As J increases from JL to JH, the wage function shifts upward from w(a,JL) to w(a,JH), 
while the “promotion range” (aL,aH) shrinks.SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE37
Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Newly Appointed CEOs, 1970-2000 
1970-1979  1980-1989  1990-2000 
Panel A
Newly  Appointed  CEOs  903  888  992 
As % of All CEOs    10.2%    10.0%    11.3% 
Internal  Promotions   85.1%  82.8%  73.5% 
External  Hires   14.9%  17.2%  26.5% 
Panel B
Age at CEO Appointment 
      
All  New  Appointments  53.3  53.3  53.9 
Internal  Promotions   53.2  53.5  53.5 
External  Hires   51.9  52.1  53.2 
Panel C
Tenure at CEO Appointment 
      
All  New  Appointments  18.2  17.2  14.1 
Internal  Promotions   21.3  20.7  19.2 
External Hires    d1.0 d1.0 d1.0
Panel D
New CEOs with MBAs 
      
All  New  Appointments   13.8%  22.1%  28.7% 
Internal  Promotions   13.4%  21.1%  29.7% 
External  Hires   17.0%  28.3%  24.6% 
Note: Executives serving in their firm for less than a year before the CEO appointment are considered 
external hires, while those employed for more than a year are considered inside hires. Data 
include all companies appearing in Forbes annual surveys between 1970 and 2000, and include 
2,783 newly appointed CEOs from 1,323 companies. SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE38
Table 2 
Coefficients from OLS regression of estimated annual 




Estimated Annual Industry 
Wage Premium 
Intercept .0828 
Outside hires as % of CEO 






Sample Size  182 
Note:  t-statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable is the 
estimated coefficient Djt from annual regressions:
 ln(CEO  Pay)it = Dt + Etln(Sales)it + 6jt Djt,
where j  {1,7} is the one-digit SIC industry (one-digit 
industries 8 and 9 and grouped with 7). The independent 
variable is the number of outside hires (relative to all CEO 
appointments) in industry j over the period t-5 to t-1.SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE39
Table 3 
Coefficients of Fixed-Effects Regressions of Cash Compensation 
for CEOs Promoted Internally and Hired from Outside 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Salary + Bonus) 






    (1)    (2) (3) (4) 








First Year as CEO   -.2098   
(-15.9)


























yes    yes yes yes 
R
2    .424    .542 .441 .230 
Sample  Size    21,729    7,212 7,124 7,393 
Note:  t-statistics in parentheses. Executives serving in their firm for less than a year before the CEO 
appointment are considered external hires, while those employed for more than a year are 
considered inside hires. Data include 4,597 executives from 2,144 firms from 1970 to 2000. 
Industry-Year fixed effects based on one-digit primary SIC codes.SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE40
Table 4 
Linear Probability Models Predicting CEO Departures Using CEO Age64,
and Two-Year Net-of-Industry Returns 
Dependent Variable =1 
if last year for CEO 
Dependent Variable =1 
if CEO is replaced from outside 















    (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept    .0781 .1154 .2108    .0130 .0195 .0450 
(Dummy)  




























2    .084 .058 .024    .005 .006 .007 
Sample Size    7,131  8,024  8,135    649  788  667 
Note:  t-statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns (1) through (3)  is equal to 1 if the CEO is 
serving in his last full fiscal year and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (4) through (6)  is equal 
to 1 if the departing CEO is replaced by an external hire and 0 otherwise. Net-of-industry return equals the 
total shareholder return less the value-weighted return of all Compustat companies in the same two-digit SIC 
industry. Young CEOs are defined as CEOs younger than 64 as of the fiscal year-end. Qualitative results 
unchanged using logistic methodologies.SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE41
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: (a) The maximization problem (2) yields the following first order 
condition:
f’(n*(a))Ja = w.                    (13) 
Let n  = n*(a). Conditions (13) and (4) imply that f’(n )(n +1) = f(n ), which means that n
is a constant. Next, note that the left hand side of (9), which represents demand for workers 
in the whole economy, decreases in w.  Now assume for the moment that w does not change 
with J. Then (13) immediately implies that n*(a) increases in J, (4) implies that a * decreases
in J, and (6) implies that aL1*(n) is independent of J. Differentiating (7) and (8) implicitly 
with respect to J and using the Envelope Theorem, we get 
) ( ) (
) ( * ) ( *
n f n f








X = L,H. Since Jf(nH) – f(n) > 0, while Jf(nL) – f(n) < 0, we get that if w does not change with 




w n aH and 0
) ( * 2 !
wJ
w n aL . Applying all these results to examine the effects of 
an increase in J on the demand for workers, we find that the left hand side of (9) increases in 
J, i.e., there is excess demand for workers if wage does not adjust. Because in equilibrium the 
labor markets must clear and because the demand for workers decreases in w, it follows that 





. Condition (6) then immediately yields 
0
) ( * 1 !
wJ
w n aL .
Next, the first order condition (13) must hold for all ability levels, which means that 
f’(nH
*)JaH
* = w*. Plugging this to (8), we have
Jf(nH
*) – f(n) =  f’(nH
*)J( nH
* – n).
Implicit differentiation with respect to J then yields SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE42
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*) ( ' . But from the first order condition (13), nH* monotonically 






  The same arguments can be used to show that  0
) ( * 2 !
wJ
w n aL . Combining (13) and (7) 
we obtain 
*) *)( ( ' *) ( ) * *)( ( "
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(b) Assume for the moment that w*/J is independent of J. Then (13) and (4) respectively 
imply that n*(a) and  * a  are both independent of J, while (6) means that aL1*(n) increases in 
J.  Moreover, from part (a) we know that aL2*(n) increases and aH*(n) decreases in J. Using 
these results, together with m’(w) < 0, to evaluate the effect of an increase in J on demand for 
workers, we find that the left hand side of (9) decreases in J if N is sufficiently large. This 
means that the increase in w* must be smaller than assumed if an equilibrium in the labor 
market is to be restored, that is, w*/J must decrease in J if N is sufficiently large. Conditions 
(13) and (4), together with w
M* = f(n*(a))Ja – w*n*(a) then deliver the inequalities in part 
(b) of the lemma in a straightforward way. 




















! . Now, using 
0













a a , limaĺf’(n
*)a = limaĺw*/J = w*/J, and limaĺ f(n
*) = SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE43
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, for all a   a
+.
Note that none of the arguments in this proof depend upon the value of the rent-
extraction parameter U. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 1:  Claim (i) and the first part of claim (ii) follow immediately from 
Lemma 2. To see that the second part of claim (ii) holds, i.e., that the total compensation of 
an average CEO increases with J, notice first that it is again immediate from Lemma 2 that 
the total pay of the CEOs who receive no rents increases with J if N is sufficiently large, 
because their total compensation is equal to their market wage,  ) (
* a w
M . For those CEOs 
who do receive rents it must be that s = 1, so that their total equilibrium pay can be written as 
P(n,a,J) =  ] * ) ( [ ) ( ) 1 ( ) , , ( ) (
* * n w a n f a w s a n a w
M M       U U US .
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w
n n a n f   !  .                  (14) 
Now, differentiating the left hand side of (9) with respect to J, and letting Nof , we see that 










. Neither of these cases can be 
true in equilibrium, as (9) must hold for any given J, i.e., the derivative of the left hand side 





. By continuity in N, this implies that 
(14) holds for N sufficiently large. Q.E.D. SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE44
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1. Thus, the ratio of 
the CEO to worker wage has the same sign for any given ability level and depends only upon 





, of the equilibrium worker wage with respect to J.  But e < 1 if 
and only if w*/J decreases in J. This holds if N is sufficiently large, as shown in the proof of 
part (b) in Lemma 2. 
             Similarly,  0
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 as Nof .
Therefore, by continuity in N, the inequality must hold for N sufficiently large.
To prove the second claim, note first that 
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, which holds if N is 





 (by Lemma 2b).  Similarly, using the expression 
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   , which is 
positive for large N, as proved above.  Q.E.D. SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE45










a dG , the claim follows immediately from part (a) in Lemma 2, 
according to which aL1*(n) and aL2*(n) increase and aH*(n) decreases in J. Moreover, the 





a dG , which increases in J, due 
to a decrease in aH*(n). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Differentiating the worker’s objective function with respect to I and 
ei yields   
e
e U E i a
wIw




A ³ . Hence, Ea(U(ei,I)) exhibits 
increasing differences in ei and I, which means that ei* increases in I (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1990). Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 5: The assumptions on the second derivatives of V mean that
V(-dI,dO,J) is supermodular, which immediately implies that dO
* increases and dI
* decreases 
in J  (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Q.E.D.  SEPTEMBER2004 THEMARKET FOR CEOS P AGE46
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